Abstract. We present a new elliptic curve cryptosystem with fast encryption and key generation, which is provably secure in the standard model. The scheme uses arithmetic modulo n 2 , where n is an RSA modulus, and merges ideas from Paillier and Rabin related schemes. Despite the typical bit length of n, our encryption algorithm is faster than El Gamal elliptic curve cryptosystems. The one-wayness of the new cryptosystem is as hard as factoring n while the semantic security is proved under a reasonable decisional assumption. Two new length-preserving trapdoor permutations equivalent to factoring are also described.
Introduction
Several elliptic curve based cryptosystems have been proposed during the last decades. On the one hand, cryptosystems related to the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem (such as elliptic curve versions of El Gamal) have the feature of having small keysizes, at the cost of moderate encryption/decryption times. On the other hand, cryptosystems based on elliptic curves over the ring Z n have security related to the hardness of factoring n = pq. Therefore, their keysizes are the same as in RSA schemes while encryption/decryption times are greater. In both cases, messages are hidden by means of computing multiples of points. Thus, the computational cost depends on the size of the multiplier.
In this paper, a minimal encryption-time cryptosystem based on elliptic curves is proposed. The encryption function is related to the computation of doubles of points on elliptic curves over Z n 2 , and is reminiscent of the BlumWilliams trapdoor permutation. Despite the typical size of n, the encryption algorithm is faster than in elliptic curve versions of El Gamal. Furthermore, if the encryption efficiency is measured in terms of encryption time per plaintext bit, the difference is even greater.
As done in [8] , the new cryptosystem works on a family of supersingular elliptic curves. Since doubling points on elliptic curves over Z n is not a bijection, the set of allowed points must be restricted to the subset D n of doubles of points. We show that if p ≡ q ≡ 5 mod 12 then doubling points in D n is a trapdoor permutation whose one-wayness is equivalent to factoring n. Now, by following the ideas in [2] , this bijection is lifted to Z n 2 and the definition of the new cryptosystem arises. Its semantic security is proven equivalent to a new decisional problem, that is in turn related to the existence of small roots of some polynomials. Since the best result in this area (namely [3] ) does not apply to our case, the new problem is supposed to be intractable.
By taking profit of some interesting techniques, the one-wayness of the proposed cryptosystem is proved to be equivalent to factoring n.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 is devoted to introduce the definition and some results about elliptic curves. Section 3 briefly recalls the schemes our cryptosystem is related to; in section 4 we propose new trapdoor permutations equivalent to factoring. In section 5, we describe the new scheme and prove that its one-wayness is based on the hardness of factoring the modulus. We also prove that the proposed scheme is semantically secure under a new assumption. Then, we argue why one should be confident on this new assumption. Finally, the computational cost of the new scheme is discussed in section 6.
Some Results about Elliptic Curves
In this section, we are going to summarize the definition and some results about elliptic curves defined over the finite field Z p , and over the rings Z p 2 and Z n 2 , where n is an RSA modulus. Definition 1. Let p > 3 be a prime. An elliptic curve over the finite field Z p , denoted by E p (a, b), where a, b ∈ Z p , and gcd(4a 3 + 27b 2 , p) = 1, is the set of points (x, y) ∈ Z p × Z p such that y 2 = x 3 + ax + b mod p, with a point O called the point at infinity.
The set E p (a, b) is a group, with the usual tangent-and-chord operation. We will denote by |E p (a, b)| the number of elements of the group E p (a, b) and by r#P the p-th multiple of a point P ∈ E p (a, b). For an extensive treatment on elliptic curves we refer to [11] , and for an overview on elliptic curve cryptosystems, see [10] .
Elliptic curves can also be defined on the projective plane P 2 (Z p ) as the set of points (x : y : z) satisfying y 2 z = x 3 + axz 2 + bz 3 mod p, and gcd(x, y, z, p) = 1. In particular, the point (0 : 1 : 0) corresponds to the point at infinity O. Following [4] , this definition can be extended to the ring Z p 2 . The natural map π p : E p 2 (a, b) → E p (a, b) that reduces coordinates modulo p, is a surjective group morphism whose kernel is the set {O m = (mp : 1 : 0) | m ∈ Z p }, called the set of points at infinity.
E n 2 (a, b) can be defined from the natural surjective maps from E n 2 (a, b) to E p 2 (a, b) and E q 2 (a, b). Via the Chinese Remainder Theorem, E n 2 (a, b) can be seen as a group isomorphic to E p 2 (a, b) × E q 2 (a, b). The natural group morphism from E n 2 (a, b) to E n (a, b) will be denoted as π n . Points on curves E n 2 (a, b) can be classified in three types:
-Points at infinity: O m = (mn : 1 : 0), m ∈ Z n , (the kernel of π n ) -Affine points: (x, y) = (x : y : 1) ∈ E n 2 (a, b).
-Semi-infinite points: (x : y : z) ∈ E n 2 (a, b), with gcd(z, n) = p or q.
The usual tangent-and-chord formulas allow to perform addition of affine points on E n 2 (a, b), without knowledge of the factorisation of n. In particular, the formula to double an affine point is the following:
To deal with points at infinity the following addition formulas are used:
Some Previous Elliptic Curve Based Schemes
In [4] , Galbraith proposes an elliptic curve scheme based on the one-way trapdoor function
where Q ∈ E n 2 (a, b) is a fixed point whose order is a big-enough factor of |E n (a, b)|. The semantic security of the scheme C = X Q (r, m) is related to the following decisional problem: given an RSA modulus n, an elliptic curve E n 2 (a, b), a point Q ∈ E n 2 (a, b) whose order is a divisor of |E n (a, b)|, and a random point S ∈ E n 2 (a, b), determine whether S lies on the subgroup generated by Q. The scheme has a high computational cost, both in key generation and decryption. Moreover, Galbraith's scheme involves the computation of the multiple r#Q, where r has roughly the same length as n. Koyama et al. propose in [8] a (deterministic) elliptic curve RSA based scheme. They use supersingular elliptic curves of type E n (0, b), b ∈ Z * n , and thus avoid the problem of computing |E n (a, b)|, because |E n (0, b)| = (p + 1)(q + 1) when p ≡ q ≡ 2 mod 3. To encrypt a message m = (x, y) ∈ Z n ×Z n , the following trapdoor one-way function is used:
where e#(x, y) stands for the e-multiple of (x, y) computed on the elliptic curve E n (0, b), where b = y 2 − x 3 mod n. Let us observe that the elliptic curve used to perform the computation is determined by the message point. Although it is required that b ∈ Z * n in order to be able to perform the computation, this condition is fulfilled with overwhelming probability. For e such that gcd(e, (p + 1)(q+1)) = 1, the trapdoor is d = e −1 mod lcm(p+1, q+1), since d#(e#(x, y)) = (x, y) on E n (0, b).
A probabilistic version of KMOV scheme has been proposed in [6] . Basically, this scheme is a lifted version of KMOV that works on supersingular elliptic curves over Z n 2 . For small values of e, KMOV[n, e] as well as its lifted version are significantly more efficient than Galbraith's scheme, as shown in [6] .
The optimal efficiency would be achieved using e = 2, but in this case the map KMOV[n, 2] is not bijective (some points have 4 pre-images, others have none). We will overcome this inconvenience by restricting the set of points on the elliptic curves used, and using an RSA modulus n = pq such that p ≡ q ≡ 5 mod 12. We will obtain a new trapdoor permutation equivalent to factoring.
New Trapdoor Permutations
In this section, the well-known Blum-Williams trapdoor permutation is adapted to the elliptic curve setting.
Blum-Williams Function
Let n = pq be an RSA modulus with p ≡ q ≡ 3 mod 4, and let Q n be the set of quadratic residues modulo n. The squaring function restricted to Q n , i.e.
is a trapdoor one-way permutation if factoring large numbers is unfeasible (see page 34 in [7] ). Let us briefly recall how to invert G n , provided the factorisation of n (see [12] for a nice account on this). We first compute the numbers f = c mod q, which are the square roots of c modulo p and modulo q that are quadratic residues to their respective modulus. Then, by using the Chinese Remainder Theorem, we obtain an s ∈ Q n such that s 2 = c mod n.
Point-Doubling Trapdoor Permutation
As in KMOV scheme, only supersingular curves E n (0, b), b ∈ Z * n , will be considered. Thus, p ≡ q ≡ 2 mod 3. A new restriction on the prime factors of n must be introduced, in order to avoid the existence of points of order 4.
, and consequently there are no points of order 4 on E p (0, b). Also, there is a unique point of order 2, namely (η, 0), where η is the unique cubic root of −b. This implies that given a point P ∈ E p (0, b), the equation 2#P = 2#P has exactly two solutions:P = P andP = P + (η, 0), since the order of the pointP − P divides 2. Now, the elliptic analogous to the set of quadratic residues is defined.
Definition 2. For n = pq, and p ≡ q ≡ 5 mod 12, let
where the double 2#(x, y) is computed on the curve E n (0, b),
We say that (x, y) ∈ Z n × Z * n is a double if it is in D n . We will also consider the sets D p and D q defined in the same way as D n , but using modulo p and q instead of n. From the Chinese Remainder Theorem, it is clear that
Proof. Let Q = (u, v) ∈ D n . Then, there exists a point P = (x, y) on the same curve such that Q = 2#P and y ∈ Z * n . Let us suppose that v = 0 mod p. This implies that 2#π p (Q) = O and then 4#π p (P ) = O. Since there are no points of order 4 on E p (0, b), we can assure that 2#π p (P ) = O. So, y ≡ 0 mod p, which is a contradiction.
From observation 1 it is clear that the equation 2#P = Q has exactly two solution P,P ∈ E p (0, b). Since there are p−1
By considering the p − 1 possible values for b, we obtain the claimed result
Proposition 1. Let n = pq, with p ≡ q ≡ 5 mod 12. Then, the following map is a bijection:
Proof. ∆ n is well-defined by the definition of D n and lemma 1. In order to prove that ∆ n is injective, let us consider Q 1 and Q 2 in D n such that 2#Q 1 = 2#Q 2 . This implies, on the one hand, that there exist P 1 and P 2 such that Q 1 = 2#P 1 and Q 2 = 2#P 2 . On the other hand, P 1 , P 2 , Q 1 and Q 2 lie on the same curve and 2#(Q 2 − Q 1 ) = O. Thus, 4#(P 2 − P 1 ) = O which implies 2#P 2 = 2#P 1 , since there are no points of order 4 in E n (0, b). Therefore, Q 2 = Q 1 . Finally, by a simple counting argument, ∆ n must be surjective.
We point out that ∆ n is an elliptic analogous of Blum-Williams function.
Proposition 2. If p ≡ q ≡ 5 mod 12, then ∆ n is a trapdoor permutation equivalent to factoring n.
Proof. Let us see, given the trapdoor information, p and q, how to invert ∆ n efficiently on a point Q ∈ D n . Since ∆ n is a bijection, there exist a point P ∈ D n such that Q = 2#P , but there also exists another point R ∈ D n such that P = 2#R, that is Q = 4#R. Let us consider the points
and
. Thus, the preimage P of Q can be easily computed from T p and T q by the Chinese Reminder Theorem. In fact, a point-halving procedure that works in a more general case can be found in [8] . Now, to conclude the proof, it suffices to show a reduction from the onewayness of ∆ n to the problem of factoring n. To do this, take a random pair P = (x,ȳ) ∈ Z n × Z * n and compute Q = 2#P , that is uniformly distributed in D n . Observe that π q (P ) ∈ D q but π p (P ) ∈ D p with probability 1/4. Let us consider we are in this case. Since Q ∈ D n , there exists a point P = (x, y) ∈ D n such that Q = 2#P . Let us consider an algorithm A such that on input (n, Q) returns P with probability . If A succeeds then 2#P = 2#P . We can assure now that π q (P ) = π q (P ) andx = x mod p (note that, ifx = x mod p, then π p (P ) = ±π p (P ) and π p (P ) ∈ D p , which is a contradiction). Finally, gcd(x−x, n) = p. By considering also the case π p (P ) ∈ D p and π q (P ) ∈ D q , it is straightforward to show that this procedure gives a nontrivial factor of n with probability /2.
Lifted Trapdoor Bijection
Next, a lifted version of the map ∆ n is presented. The technique used here is somewhat related to the one used in [5] . The following useful property allows to lift a point
Proof. Let y = y 0 + γn ∈ Z * n 2 , where γ ∈ Z n . Then, (x 0 , y) belongs to E n 2 (0, b) if and only if
Let n = pq, with p ≡ q ≡ 5 mod 12, and let us consider the following sets:
and the function
where P = (x, y), and the double as well as the addition are performed on
Lemma 3. If p ≡ q ≡ 5 mod 12, then the map ψ n is well defined and bijective.
Proof. The map ψ n is well-defined since ψ n (x, y, m) is always in Ω n . This comes from the definition of Ω n , since ψ n (x, y, m) ∈ Ω n if and only if π n (ψ n (x, y, m)) ∈ D n . As (x, y) ∈ ω m , π n (x, y) ∈ D n and then π n (ψ n (x, y, m)) = π n (2#(x, y)) = 2#π n (x, y) ∈ D n . In order to show that ψ n is injective, let us suppose ψ n (x, y, m) = ψ n (x , y , m ) for some (x, y), (x , y ) ∈ ω n and m, m ∈ Z n . Reducing this equality modulo n, we obtain 2#π n (x, y) = 2#π n (x , y ). By the injectivity of ∆ n and from the fact that π n (x, y) and π n (x, y) are points in D n we deduce π n (x, y) = π n (x , y ). Now, taking into account that (x, y), (x , y ) belong to the same curve E n 2 (0, b), and that 0 ≤ x, x < n, we use Property 1 to deduce (x, y) = (x , y ). From this, it is easy to see that
Finally, let us show that ψ n is surjective. Let
that is a point in D n and let P 0 ∈ D n such that Q 0 = 2#P 0 . The point P 0 can be efficiently computed by using the procedure for inverting ∆ n described in the proof of proposition 2. Then, let P = (x, y) ∈ E n 2 (0, b) the point given in property 1 computed from P 0 . Clearly, P ∈ ω n and C − 2#P is a point at infinity, say O m . Then, C = ψ n (x, y, m).
To conclude the proof, it suffices to show a reduction from the one-wayness of ψ n to the problem of factoring n. As in the proof of proposition 2, take a random pair (x,ȳ) ∈ Z n × Z * n and compute Q 0 = (u 0 , v 0 ) = 2#(x,ȳ). Now randomly lift Q 0 obtaining C = (u 0 + µn, v 0 + νn), where µ and ν are randomly selected in Z n . Note that C is uniformly distributed on Ω n . Let us consider an algorithm A such that on input (n, C) returns P = (x, y) ∈ ω n and m ∈ Z n such that C = ψ n (x, y, m), with probability . If A succeeds, then ∆ n (π n (x, y)) = 2#π n (x, y) = π n (C) = Q 0 . So, by following the same steps as in the proof of proposition 2, a nontrivial factor of n is found with probability /2.
The New Scheme
Based on the previous trapdoor bijection, in this section we present an elliptic curve cryptosystem (ECC) over the ring Z n 2 which is semantically secure under a new decisional assumption and has the fastest encryption and the highest one-way security among the known ECC, in the standard model.
Key generation. Given a security parameter , choose at random two primes p and q with bits such that p ≡ q ≡ 5 mod 12. Then the public key is PK={n}, n = pq, and the private key is SK={p, q}.
Encryption. To encrypt a message m ∈ Z n we choose at random z ∈ Z n and t ∈ Z * n such that b 0 = t 2 − z 3 ∈ Z * n . This choice determines an elliptic curve E n (0, b 0 ) and a point R = (z, t) on it. Let P 0 = (x 0 , y 0 ) = 2#R and γ chosen at random in Z n , and compute y = y 0 + γn. Then P = (x 0 , y) is a random point in ω n . The encryption of the message m ∈ Z n is C = ψ n (x 0 , y, m).
Decryption. To recover the message m from the ciphertext C = (u, v) = ψ n (x, y, m), the randomness (x, y) ∈ ω n is computed firstly and, afterwards, m is easily obtained from O m = C − 2#(x, y). This is just the procedure detailed in the proofs of propositions 2 and 3. We recall the steps to obtain (x, y) from C. Firstly, compute π n (x, y) by inverting ∆ n on π n (C) (using the Chinese Reminder Theorem). Next, compute (x, y) ∈ E n 2 (0, b), where b = v 2 − u 3 mod n 2 , by using property 1.
In the following, the security of this scheme is analyzed. Let us introduce some convenient notations. If A is a finite set, x ← A will denote that x is randomly selected with uniform distribution in A. We will denote by D 1 ≈ D 2 the fact that two probability distributions D 1 and D 2 are polynomially indistinguishable. Notice that if g is a bijection such that g and g −1 can be computed in probabilistic polynomial time, then
M will denote the set of integers n = pq such that p and q are two primes with bits, and p ≡ q ≡ 5 mod 12.
One-Wayness
The following lemma allows to compute, with overwhelming probability, a rational function of the coordinates of a point P 0 ∈ D n , given two special lifted points Q 1 and Q 2 such that π n (Q 1 ) = π n (Q 2 ) = 2#P 0 .
Lemma 4. Let Q 1 = (u 1 , v 1 ) = 2#P 1 and Q 2 = (u 2 , v 2 ) = 2#P 2 where P 1 and P 2 are different points in ω n such that π n (P 1 ) = π n (P 2 ). Let b 1 = v Proof. Since P 1 , P 2 ∈ ω n we can write P 1 = (x 0 , y 1 ) and P 2 = (x 0 , y 2 ), where y 1 ≡ y 2 ≡ y 0 mod n and x 0 < n. Observe that both points lie in different curves. Indeed, Q 1 and P 1 are in E n (0, b 1 ) while Q 2 and P 2 are in E n (0, b 2 ). Since
By using the doubling formula, we obtain Note that if Q 1 and Q 2 are chosen at random (but fulfilling the conditions in lemma 4) then α ∈ Z * n with overwhelming probability. From this lemma, given a random modulus n, we can exploit an adversary A against the one-wayness of the proposed scheme to build such two points Q 1 and Q 2 , and efficiently derive a nontrivial factor of n.
Proposition 4. The one-wayness of the proposed scheme is equivalent to the unfeasability of factoring the modulus.
Proof. Let A be an adversary trying to break the one-wayness of the proposed cryptosystem. Let us consider the following probability
The following algorithm B can be used to obtain a nontrivial factor of n ← M .
B(n)
At steps 1 to 4 of the algorithm, a random point Q 0 = (u 0 , v 0 ) ∈ D n is built. Next, points Q 1 = (u 1 , v 1 ) and Q 2 = (u 2 , v 2 ) are built by calling A twice using two randomly lifted points C 1 and C 2 coming from the same point Q 0 .
If A succeeds in the first call, at step 6, then Q 1 can be written as Q 1 = 2#P 1 where P 1 ∈ ω n . This is a consequence of the bijectivity of ψ n , since C 1 ∈ Ω n , and then there exists a unique P 1 ∈ ω n and a unique m 1 ∈ Z n such that m 1 ) . The same occurs with Q 2 = 2#P 2 , if A succeeds in the second call.
Let us consider the case that A succeeds in both calls. Note that Q 0 = π n (C 1 ) = π n (C 2 ) and Q 0 = 2#π n (P 1 ) = 2#π n (P 2 ). But there is only one point in D n whose double is Q 0 . Thus, π n (P 1 ) = π n (P 2 ). Let P 0 = (x 0 , y 0 ) = π n (P 1 ) = π n (P 2 ). Since Q 1 and Q 2 fulfil the conditions in the previous lemma, then
n . On the other hand, Q 0 = 2#(x 0 ,ȳ 0 ) = 2#P 0 . Observe that P 0 ∈ D n but P 0 = (x 0 ,ȳ 0 ) is chosen at random. By using the Chinese Reminder Theorem, π p (P 0 ) = π p (P 0 ) with probability 1/2, and independently π q (P 0 ) = π q (P 0 ) with probability 1/2. So, with probability 1/4, π q (P 0 ) = π q (P 0 ) but π p (P 0 ) = π p (P 0 ). The last expression impliesx 0 = x 0 mod p. To see this, let us supposex 0 = x 0 mod p. Then, π p (P 0 ) = −π p (P 0 ). From 2#P 0 = 2#P 0 we deduce 4#π p (P 0 ) = O. Since there are no points with order 4 on E p (0, b 0 mod p) then 2#π p (P 0 ) = O and consequentlyȳ 0 ≡ 0 mod p. But, this is not possible due to step 2 in the algorithm.
Except for a negligible fraction of the values of (x 0 ,ȳ 0 ), it can be also shown that By considering the other case, π p (P 0 ) = π p (P 0 ) but π q (P 0 ) = π q (P 0 ), the previous gcd expression leads to the other nontrivial factor of n.
Finally, except for a negligible function of (due to the technical steps 2, 3 and 10, and the anomalous values of (x 0 ,ȳ 0 )) the success probability
is one half the probability that A is successful in both calls. Notice that this two calls are not independent, since they share the same values of n and Q 0 . However, by using lemma 5 (given in appendix A) with algorithm A, predicate P = "A succeeds" and map f (n, C) = (n, π n (C)), the following inequality is obtained:
Succ
1 The exception are points (x0,ȳ0) such thatx0 mod p is a root of a certain polynomial of degree 8. However, by making some cumbersome calculations, it can be shown that if p ≡ 1 mod 8 then there are no exceptional points, otherwise, i.e. p ≡ 5 mod 8, there are only p − 1 exceptional points (modulo p), that is, only a fraction 1/p. (See appendix B for details.)
Semantic Security
The scheme is semantically secure under the following assumption:
Assumption 1 (Decisional Small-x Double (DSD) Assumption). The following probability distributions are polynomially indistinguishable
Proposition 5. The proposed scheme is semantically secure if and only if the DSM assumption holds.
Proof. Semantic security is equivalent to indistinguishability of encryptions, so we have to prove that for all m 0 ∈ Z n , the distributions
are polynomially indistinguishable. From the definition of sum of an affine point and a point at infinity given at the end of section 2, it is easy to see that the map
Note that the distribution on the left side is D double . Besides, since 2#(x, y) + O m = ψ n (x, y, m ), and ψ n is a bijection, then D and D random are identical distributions.
Finally, we argue why one should be confident about the hardness of the new decisional problem presented in this paper.
According to the formula for computing the double of a point on an elliptic curve E n 2 (0, b) (see end of Section 2), given (u, v) = 2#(x 1 , y 1 ), x 1 is a root of the univariate polynomial R(x) = x 4 + 4x
. Then, DSD assumption is related to the difficulty of deciding if the polynomial R(x) has a root smaller than n.
Similarly, the semantic security of other related cryptosystems (such as [2] ) is related to the difficulty of deciding if a certain polynomial has a root smaller than n. The best known way to attack the above decisional problems is to solve their computational versions. The problem of finding small roots of polynomials modulo a large integer with unknown factorisation has been directly studied in the literature. The most powerful result in this area was obtained by Coppersmith in [3] . This result ensures that one can efficiently compute (i.e. in polynomial time)
all roots x 1 of a polynomial P (x) ∈ Z K [x] with degree d such that |x 1 | < K 1/d . Up to now, no improvement on this bound has been made. The result by Coppersmith implies we can only find the roots |x 1 | < (n 2 ) 1/4 = n 1/2 of the polynomial R(x), which does not affect the validity of DSD assumption.
We point out that if we construct a similar encryption scheme over Z n 2 , that is f (m, r) = r 2 + mn mod n 2 (the scheme in [5] using e = 1), then the resulting scheme is not semantically secure anymore. This is due to the fact that the related decisional problem is trivially solved. In order to see if c is an encryption of m it suffices to check if c − mn mod n 2 is a square over the integers. This is why we are interested in constructing a Rabin-based scheme using elliptic curves over Z n 2 .
Efficiency Analysis
Now we study the encryption cost of our scheme. Since operations modulo a large number are involved, we neglect the cost of performing additions, multiplications and divisions by small integers. We will express the cost in terms of multiplications mod n, because modular inverses can be computed within a constant number of modular multiplications.
Generating (x, y) ∈ ω n : 5 multiplications modulo n, 1 inverse modulo n, and 1 n-length integer multiplication.
Computing 2#(x, y): 5 multiplications modulo n 2 , 1 inverse modulo n 2 .
Adding O m : 3 multiplications modulo n, 2 n-length integer multiplication.
We point out that a −1 mod n 2 can be obtained by computing a −1 mod n and then performing two multiplications modulo n 2 . Let c be the number of multiplications modulo n needed to compute a −1 mod n. Since the cost of multiplying two numbers mod n 2 is roughly the cost of 4 multiplications modulo n, we deduce that a −1 mod n 2 can be computed in 8 + c multiplications modulo n. Practical implementations, suggests than the value c = 8 can be taken (see [1] ).
Then, since the n-length integer multiplication cost is bounded by the cost of a multiplication modulo n, the encryption cost of our scheme is 55 multiplications modulo n. Thus we have proved that our scheme is drastically more efficient than the previous semantically secure elliptic curve cryptosystems (ECC) in the standard model based on factoring.
Next, we will compare the efficiency of our scheme with the well-known El Gamal ECC scheme. We assume that El Gamal ECC is performed over Z * p , where p is 160 bits long, and our scheme is performed over Z * n 2 , where n is 1024 bits long (cf. [9] ). We will express both encryption costs in terms of multiplications modulo n.
In El Gamal ECC the most time consuming operation is the computation of two multiples r#P and ra#P , where r is a random integer whose size is roughly the same as the modulus p, and a is a fixed integer. Then, using the double and add algorithm, the computation of these two multiples requires on average k additions of points and 2k doublings, where k is the bit length of r. Assuming that a point addition or doubling requires about 12 modular multiplications, then El Gamal ECC would take approximately 3 · 160 · 12 multiplications modulo p. Since the time needed to perform a modular multiplication is quadratic in the size of the modulus, the ratio between the time of a multiplication modulo p and a multiplication modulo n is 160 2 1024 2 . It follows that the encryption time of El Gamal ECC would be equivalent to 159 multiplications modulo n, which is almost three times the encryption cost of our scheme. If the efficiency is measured in terms of encryption-time per plaintext bit, this ratio must be multiplied by the ratio of the message lengths. Therefore, our cryptosystem is 18 times faster than El Gamal ECC in encryption-time per bit.
Thus, our cryptosystem is the provably secure IND-CPA elliptic curve cryptosystem in the standard model with the fastest encryption algorithm to the best of our knowledge.
The key generation of the proposed cryptosystem is faster than generating an RSA key, since only the modulus is needed. Regarding decryption, the main cost is due to the computation of p+3 4 #P ∈ E p (0, b), and q+3 4 #P ∈ E q (0, b), from P ∈ E n (0, b) which is almost the same as in the other existing ECC over Z n 2 . Nevertheless, from a global point of view, it is unlikely that our scheme could compete with El Gamal ECC, due to its decryption cost. 
A Technical Lemma
This technical lemma is useful when dealing with two non-independent calls to a probabilistic algorithm.
Lemma 5. Consider a probabilistic algorithm A with input x ∈ X, a (surjective) map f : X → Y , and a predicate P on the input and the output of A (e.g. P (n, A(n)) true if A(n) is a nontrivial factor of n).
where the internal random coins used by A in the two calls are independent.
Proof. For any y ∈ Y , let us define
Then y∈Y w y = 1 and y∈Y w y y = . Given the following experiment
But the condition f (x 1 ) = y is equivalent to modifying the experiment into
. So, in this new probability space, x 1 and x 2 are identically distributed independent random variables, and
y . By using for instance the Cauchy-Schwartz inequality for a suitable weighted inner product (i.e. a · b = y∈Y w y a y b y ), it is straightforward to see that y∈Y w y 2 y ≥ 2 .
Observe that, although the two calls to A are not independent, they share part of the input. So, there can be a positive correlation (due to the map f ) between their outputs. This is the reason (and not the independence) why the success probability of the two calls can be bounded by the square of the success probability of a single call. Typically, the image of f is a part of the input of A, e.g. when the same RSA modulus is used in both calls to A.
This lemma applies to almost all security proofs in the literature related to an RSA modulus, where more than one call to an adversary is made.
B Computing the Number of Exceptional Points
In this appendix, we compute the number of points (x,ȳ) ∈ Z p × Z * p such that x = x and On the other hand,x y = ρ x y , where ρ is a fourth root of unity. This equation is equivalent to (x + 2η)(x − η) = −3ρηx, that means x is a root of the polynomial equation (x + 2η)
4 (x − η) 4 = 81η 4 x 4 . So, there are at most 8 different values of x, given η. Moreover, there are at most 16 points (x,ȳ) in each curve E p (0, b) satisfying the conditions at the beginning of this appendix. Finally, the probability that one of these points is guessed at random is at most 16/p.
A tighter bound for this probability can be obtained if the quadratic equation (x+2η)(x−η) = −3ρηx is discussed for each value of ρ. Let t = x/η. The equation can be rewritten as (t + 2)(t − 1) = −3ρt, and also as t 2 + (1 + 3ρ)t − 2 = 0. The discriminant of the equation is ∆ = (1 + 3ρ) 2 + 8 = 9ρ 2 + 6ρ + 9. Since p ≡ 1 mod 4, then This last step follows from a symmetry argument. In all equations, (x, y) and (x,ȳ) play a symmetric role, since (x,ȳ) = (x, y) + (η, 0) is equivalent to (x, y) = (x,ȳ) + (η, 0). But (x, y) ∈ D p and (x,ȳ) ∈ D p . Thus, only half of the solutions found correspond to values of (x, y), and the other half correspond to values of (x,ȳ).
